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ABSTRACT. Survival models for life-time data and other time-to-event data are 
widely used in many fields, including medicine, the environmental sciences, 
engineering etc. They have also found  recognition in the analysis of economic 
duration data. This paper provides a reanalysis of the Pennsylvania 
Reemployment Bonus Experiments, which were conducted in 1988-89 to examine 
the effect of different types of reemployment bonus offers on the unemployment 
spell. A Cox-proportional-hazards survival-model is fitted to the data and the 
results are compared to the results of a linear regression approach and to the 
results of a quantile regression approach. The Cox-proportional-hazards model 
provides for a remarkable goodness of fit and yields less effective treatment 
responses, therefore lower expectations concerning the overall implications of the 
Pennsylvania experiment. An influence analysis is proposed for obtaining 
qualitative information on the influence of the covariates at different quantiles. 
The results of the quantile regression and of the influence analysis show that both 
the linear regression and the Cox-model still impose stringent restrictions on the 
way covariates influence the duration distribution, however, due to its flexibility, 
the Cox-proportional hazards model is more appropriate for analysing the data. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The Unemployment Insurance (UI) Program provides short-term income support to 
involuntarily unemployed individuals while they seek work. Both from a social and an economic 
point of view, it is certainly an important policy goal to reduce the duration of unemployment 
spells. The Pennsylvania Reemployment Bonus Experiments tested the effect of different types of 
reemployment bonus offers on the unemployment spell. Six treatments that varied in the amount 
of bonuses that are offered and in the time period in which the bonus offer remains valid, were 
tested and compared to a control group.  
The Pennsylvania Reemployment Bonus Experiment data have been analysed based on 
different statistical approaches: In the Final Report (Corson et al. (1992)), the treatment response 
analysis is done by calculating the mean unemployment time for each treatment group. Using a 
linear regression approach, Corson et al. (1992) control for the relevant individual characteristics 
of the claimants and for the experimental design, such as the timing of the sample selection. 
Meyer (1995, 1996) presents the same results. Additionally, he gives an excellent review of the 
experiments, some general conclusions about their efficacy and a critique of their policy relevance. 
Koenker&Bilias (2001) perform a reanalysis of the results of the Pennsylvania Experiment based 
on a quantile regression analysis. They examine different covariates, focusing on particular 
quantiles of the distribution and they show that this approach is successful in providing a detailed 
picture of the varied effects of the covariates on the unemployment time. 
This paper intends to fit the experimental data to a Cox proportional hazards model and to 
provide a comparison between the Cox-model fit and both the quantile regression results as well 
as the linear regression results. An influence analysis is proposed for obtaining qualitative 
information on the influence of the covariates at different quantiles. An overall benefit-cost 
analysis of the effect of the different treatments is omitted here, since this is a straightforward 
procedure that doesn't produce new insights about the experiment. 
 
2. THE PENNSYLVANIA REEMPLOYMENT BONUS EXPERIMENTS 
 The current framework of the U.S. unemployment insurance system provides short-term monetary 
assistance to the involuntarily unemployed. A frequent criticism of the system has been that the 
unemployment insurance benefit acts as a disincentive for job-seekers and prolongs the duration of 
unemployment insurance spells. During the 1980’s several controlled experiments tested alternative 
compensation schemes for UI. In theses experiments, UI claimants were offered a cash bonus if they 
found a job within some specified period of time and if the job was retained for some specified 
duration. The question was:  would the promise of a monetary lump-sum benefit provide a significant 
inducement for more intensive job-seeking? 
 The first two experiments were conducted in Illinois in 1984 and 1985 and are described in detail 
by Woodbury and Spiegelman (1987). In the first experiment, a random sample of new claimants were 
told that they would receive a bonus of $500 if they found full-time employment within 11 weeks of 
filing their initial claim, and if they retained their new job for at least 4 months. In the second 
experiment, a random sample of new claimants were told that their prospective employer would be 
entitled to a bonus of $500 provided that the claimants were able to find a job and keep it under the 
same conditions as the previous experiment. The two treatments were tested against a control group of 
claimants who followed the usual rules of the Illinois UI system. 
 The Illinois experiments, and especially the bonus offer made directly to claimants provided a 
very encouraging initial indication of the incentive effects of such policies. They showed that bonus 
offers could result in a significant reduction in the duration of unemployment spells and consequently 
of the regular amounts paid by the state to UI beneficiaries. This finding let to further “bonus 
experiments” in the states of New Jersey, Pennsylvania and Washington with a variety of new 
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treatment options. In this paper we will focus more narrowly on a reanalysis of data from only the 
Pennsylvania Reemployment Bonus Demonstration described in detail in Corson et al. (1992). 
 
2.1. TREATMENT DESIGN 
   The Pennsylvania experiments were conducted by the U.S. Department of Labor between July 
1988 and October 1989. During the enrolment period, claimants who became unemployed and 
registered for unemployment benefits in one of the selected local offices throughout the state were 
randomly assigned either to a control group or one of the six experimental treatment groups. In the 
control group the existing rules of the unemployment insurance system applied. Individuals in the 
treatment groups were offered a cash bonus if they became reemployed in a full-time job, working 
more than 32 hours per week, within a specified period we call the qualification period. In addition, to 
qualify for the bonus, claimants were required to work in the new job continuously for at least 16 
weeks, or they were allowed to change jobs as long as the transition took place within a period of 5 
days. The latter requirements were imposed to discourage cases of fraudulent hiring for purposes of 
obtaining the bonus, and to avoid the possibility of bonus payments to seasonal workers. 
Two bonus levels were tested. The lower bonus was three times the weekly benefit amount, and 
the higher bonus was six times the weekly benefit. Bonuses were tied to the weekly benefit rather than 
offering a fixed amount as in the Illinois experiment, because it was felt that such a policy yielded 
more uniform incentives across individuals. It was also thought that such as system was politically 
more feasible than the fixed bonus scheme. The low bonus averaged $500 and the high bonus 
averaged $997. Two qualification periods were considered: a short period of 6 weeks and a longer one 
of 12 weeks. The long qualification period was close to that studied in Illinois and New Jersey. The 
choice of the shorter period was intended to test the sensitivity of the treatment effect to alternative 
specifications of the qualification periods. 
The bonus levels and qualification periods of the six treatment groups are described in TABLE 2.1. 
All of the treatments, except the last one, involved a voluntary option of attending a workshop 
designed to aid job search. However, less than three percent of eligible participants attended the 
workshop so we follow the practice established by prior analysts of ignoring the workshop option. In 
effect this enables us to pool treatments 4 and 6. Four of the treatments were created by the 
combination of a bonus amount and a qualification period plus the offer of the workshop. The fifth 
treatment included an initially high, but declining bonus over the period of 12 weeks plus the optional 
workshop. The sixth treatment combined the high bonus with the long qualification period without the 
workshop. 
2.2. SAMPLE DESIGN 
 The Pennsylvania experiments were designed to answer two questions. Could "policy relevant", 
i.e. politically feasible, treatments yield detectable cost savings to existing UI benefit programs? And 
how sensitive are program cost to various elements of the treatment design? For a more detailed 
description of the design goals one can consult Corson et al. (1992). Based on these objectives, as well 
as prior estimates of the magnitude of the response to the bonus offers, and a budget constraint for the 
experiment, a formal sample allocation model was developed that fulfilled the goals. The design 
provided 3,000 control and 10,120 treatment plan members; the allocation to the specific treatments is 
shown in TABLE 2.2.  
 The sample was drawn randomly from claimants at twelve Job Services (JS) offices located 
throughout the state of Pennsylvania. The limited selection of sites constituted a compromise between 
the need to obtain a fairly large sample that could accurately reflect the demographic and occupational 
characteristics of the state, and the need for an easy monitoring and low operational cost of the study. 
Effort was made to select twelve local offices, which were representative of the insured unemployed 
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population of Pennsylvania. More specifically, the state was divided in eight UI/JS regions. One or 
more clusters of local offices were formed within each region according to average duration of UI 
caseloads. Finally, one office was selected randomly from each cluster to participate in the 
demonstration. The twelve Job-Service offices chosen were: Coatesville, Philadelphia-North, 
Philadelphia-Uptown, Reading, Lancaster, Lewistown, Butler, Connellsville, McKeesport, Erie, 
Pittston and Scranton. Corson et al. (1992) comment, "UI claimants were selected randomly from 
claimants at local offices throughout Pennsylvania. The most cost-effective way to meet this objective 
was first to select a random sample of local UI/JS offices, and then to select a random sample of UI 
claimants from each of the selected offices. This process was undertaken in a manner which ensured 
that each eligible claimant in the state had an equal probability of selection into the demonstration 
sample." 
 Several criteria were imposed on potential UI claimants to determine their eligibility in the 
experiment. To be selected and assigned to one of the six treatments or to the control group, an 
individual had to: 
o file a non-transitional claim in one of the selected offices between July, 1988 and October, 
1989, 
o indicate on union or employer attachment, 
o apply for benefit starting no more than 2 weeks before their selection day, 
o be separated from their old job for reasons other than a labour dispute 
 These eligibility criteria were imposed to increase the homogeneity of the sample and thus ensure 
that possible differences in the response could be attributed primarily to variation in treatment. 
Claimants who filed for a transitional claim were excluded because of the likelihood of a previous job 
offer. For the same reason there was exclusion from the experiment of individuals who indicated that it 
was possible they could find a new job through a union channel rather than the market, or if they were 
waiting for some definite recall within 60 days from their former employer. This category of claimants 
was very unlikely to respond to a bonus offer by searching for a new job intensively. The bonus 
payments would simply constitute a "windfall" gain for them. The fourth eligibility criterion was 
established to attain the operational goal of the program to offer bonuses to claimants as soon as 
possible after they became eligible for UI. On the other hand, the Pennsylvania UI system permits 
backdating applications as long as claimants had been eligible for benefits during previous weeks. 
Requiring the unemployed not to have been separated from the most recent employer due to a labour 
dispute was dictated from the need to conduct a test for the effectiveness of job-search services; state 
and federal regulations prohibit the provision of such services to such claimants. 
 
2.3. THE  DATA 
The final collected sample was the result of fifty-two weekly sub-samples selected in all twelve 
offices beginning on October 26, 1988. Prior to that date, fifteen weekly sub-samples were drawn from 
the Pittston site for a pilot test of all operations, which are also included in the final "collected-
sample". Thus, the enrolment period for the experiment started July 1988 and ended October 1989. 
The design target was to identify and select 13,120 claimants with each site contributing roughly 1,100 
individuals in total and a weekly target of 21 claimants per site. However, since some claimants who 
initially apply for benefits do not return to a local office to file further, a larger sample was selected to 
achieve the desired sample size for analysis. Thus a sample ranging from 22 to 40 claimants was 
selected at each office per week, depending on the historical experience. Overall, 15,005 individuals 
were initially selected to participate in the demonstration. A total of 14,086 individuals filed for a 
week of UI and were included in the study. TABLE 2.2. presents the distribution of the final sample by 
treatment group under the header "Collected n". Missing values for certain variables that are needed as 
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covariates during our data analysis stage necessitated that we restrict our attention to a total of 13,913 
subjects; the last column of TABLE 2.2. presents the allocation of our analysis sample over the control 
and the six experimental groups. 
An examination of the distribution of claimants in each treatment group by quarter of entry into 
the experiment confirms two interventions that took place during the enrolment period. One change 
was dictated by the low participation rate in the job-search assistance services provided along with the 
group of treatments 1 to 5. As previously noted, the attendance in the workshop was less than 3%, 
which made the fourth and the sixth treatments indistinguishable. Therefore, as of July 1989-four 
month before the end of the experiment-individuals who would have been assigned to treatment 6 
were assigned to other treatments. A second change was made because preliminary demonstration 
results showed that treatment 1 had a larger than expected effect. Initially, only a small proportion of 
the total sample was assigned to this treatment due to its perceived low policy significance. Beginning 
October 1989, experimenters increased its sample. This change is reflected in a relatively high 
percentage, 18.3%, of entries during the last quarter. 
A detailed description of the characteristics of the claimants under study can be found in Corson et 
al. (1992). Age, race, gender, number of dependents, location in the state, existence of recall 
expectations, and type of occupation have been recorded. Standard 2χ - tests for nonrandomness of 
the allocations to the 7 treatments for each of the covariates fall well within conventional confidence 
limits, confirming the success of the randomnization procedure. Categorical variables related to these 
characteristics are used in our model - the coding was chosen as follows:  
- RECALL: 1 if the claimant answered "yes" when asked if he/she had any expectation to be 
recalled to his/her prior job 
- BLACK: 1 if the claimant is black, 0 otherwise 
- HISPANIC: 1 if the claimant is hispanic and 0 otherwise 
- OTHRACE: 1 if the claimant is neither black, nor hispanic nor white, 0 otherwise 
- FEMALE: 1 for female claimant, 0 for male 
- LUSD: 1 if the claimant filed in one of the three sites that were considered to be 
characterised by low unemployment rate and therefore shorter durations of 
unemployment, 0 otherwise. 
- MULD: 1 if the claimant filed in one of the five sites that were considered to be 
characterised by moderate unemployment rate and long duration of unemployment, 0 
otherwise. 
- HUSD: 1 if the claimant filed in one of the three sites that were considered to be 
characterized by high unemployment rate and short duration of unemployment, 0 
otherwise. 
- DURABLE: 1 if the occupation of the claimant was in the sector of durable manufacturing, 
0 otherwise 
- NONDURABLE: 1 if the occupation of the claimant was in the sector of nondurable 
manufacturing, 0 otherwise 
- DEP: indicates the number of dependents of the claimant. Coded 0, 1, or 2 if the number of 
dependents is 2 or greater 
- AGELT35: 1 if the claimant's age was less than 35 years, 0 otherwise 
- AGEGT54: if the claimant's age was more than 54 years, 0 otherwise 
- Q1,…Q5: five indicator variables indicating the quarter of enrolment of each claimant 
- TG0,…,TG5: indicator variables indicating the treatment group 0,…,5 (characterized by 
bonus amount and qualification period) in which each claimant was enrolled 
Payment of Unemployment Insurance (UI) in Pennsylvania usually starts after one waiting 
week and the potential UI duration of the vast majority (99 percent) was 26 weeks. Looking at the 
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exit rates in week 1 and in week 27, we realize that they have extreme peaks for these weeks. Due 
to the exponential form of the Cox-PH-Model, a high peak of the exit rates at week one is not 
supposed to affect the fit of the model in an absolutely unreasonable way, but the peak at week 27 
constitutes a considerable irregularity. Therefore, this paper will present two analyses: One 
analysis based on the whole data-set (hereafter referred to as case (I)) and a second analysis based 
on a reduced data set: All individuals with unemployment durations higher than 26 weeks are 
excluded (hereafter referred to as case (II)).  
Furthermore, we chose to pool the claimants assigned to treatments 4 and 6 into a single 
treatment, which is referred to as treatment 4. A rationale for this is given in the other papers on 
the Pennsylvania Bonus Experiments. Like our predecessors, we assume that the process of 
randomly attributing the subjects to the experimental groups was effective. It follows that the 
treatment effect is considered to be exclusively responsible for the differences in the length of the 
unemployment spells. 
 
3. FITTING THE COX-MODEL 
3.1. THE  COX -MODEL 
Translating the experimental situation into the language of our survival framework, the time 
from entering the study until an individual leaves the unemployment status is interpreted as the 
survival time for this individual. Consequently, the phenomenon that an individual becomes 
reemployed is an event in our model 
Doksum and Gasko (1990) provide a very useful survey of survival analysis emphasizing the 
fundamental link with binary response models and the transformation model 
  h(Ti) = i
'
i ux +β               (1) 
Many important parametric and semiparametric models may be expressed in this form: some 
monotone transformation of an observed survival time, Ti, represented as a linear predictor plus 
iid error. 
In the Cox proportional hazards model (hereafter: Cox-PH-model), which is undoubtedly the 
leading example, we have 
β'0 )(log)|(log xthxth +=            (2) 
Due to the baseline-hazard h0(t) being an unspecified function, the Cox-PH-model is a 
semiparametric model. Even though the baseline hazard is not specified, the Cox-PH-model is 
considered to yield reasonably good estimates of regression coefficients, hazard ratios and 
adjusted survival curves; it is a relatively robust model, which is probably the key reason for its 
popularity. Since we cannot be totally sure about the correct parametric model, the Cox-PH-model 
is a sensible choice. 
According to the Cox-model, the hazard for individual j is specified as 
) )(exp(X )(),( j0 βtthxthj =             (3) 
Here, )(0 th  is the aforementioned baseline hazard, an unspecified nonnegative function of time, 
β =( p...ββ1 ) is the vector of coefficients and )X,...,X(X pj,j,1j =  is the vector of covariates of 
subject j. 
The survival function based on the Cox-model then has the form: [ ] ) )t(exp(X  j)t(S)X,t(S β0= ,            (4) 
where S0(t) is the baseline survival function. 
We anticipate here that the covariates of the Cox-model presented in this paper are fixed - this 
will be motivated later. The proportional hazards assumption of the Cox-model means that the 
hazard ratio for a model with covariates that are independent of time is constant over time:  
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Here, X and X* denote two different specifications of the explanatory variables; we can think of 
two different individuals or two different groups. 
In our model, the hazard h(t,X) can be interpreted as the instantaneous potential per time unit 
for an individual to get reemployed, given that the individual was unemployed up to time t. Due to 
the proportional hazards assumption, the hazard ratio for two different values of one covariate is 
the same regardless of time.  
Nonproportionality appears in the form of time-varying coefficients. There are several 
methods to test the proportional hazards assumption for the different covariates, but even if there 
is strong evidence of nonproportionality, often the Cox-PH-model is still the best and most robust 
choice one can make (see Therneau and Grambsch (2000) for further details).  
One common method to test nonproportionality is based on the Schoenfeld-residuals, as 
proposed in Schoenfeld (1980).  Since we added a very small, normally distributed random noise 
to the event weeks, we do not have tied event times, and in this case the Schoenfeld residuals ks  
correspond to the simple expression: 
),ˆ()( kkk txXs β−= ,               (6) 
where ),ˆ( ktx β  is the weighted mean of the covariates over those still unemployed at time tk. X(k) 
is the covariate vector of the individual experiencing the k-th event, at the time of that event. 
The test for nonproportionality we use here simply tests whether the least squares line fitted to 
the scaled Schoenfeld residuals of a certain covariate has slope 0, which would indicate 
proportional hazards for the particular covariate. For both versions of our model, (I) and (II), the 
nonproportionality-test is highly significant for the variable RECALL (Chi-Square=354 for (I) and 
Chi-Square=372 for (II)). For both versions, we find some other variables that are significant, but 
for all variables the significance is totally different in (I) and (II). E.g. the variable AGELT35 is not 
significant for the short version (p=0.79), but it is highly significant for the long version 
(p=0.000017). Apparently, RECALL is the only covariate that significantly varies with time and in 
both versions. All other variables do vary slightly over the run, but the assumption of a fixed 
covariate is still reasonable and - as we will see later - still allows for a relatively good fit of our 
Cox-PH-model. The PH-assumption turns out to be reasonable for all our covariates except from 
RECALL, since we expect all other covariates to have a more or less constant influence on the 
hazard rate over the whole time of the experiment. 
 
3.2. INFLUENCE ANALYSIS AND STRATIFICATION 
Before we introduce stratification - one of the concepts that is applied to covariates, such as 
RECALL, that are obviously nonproportional - we will propose a method how we can get some 
information about the effect of a particular covariate on the survival distribution at different 
quantiles. Similar to the regular case of an ordinary least squares fit, residuals in a Cox-model can 
be used to assess the impact of each point on the fit of a model. Reid and Crépeau (1985) show a 
nice derivation of the dfbeta-residual-matrix. Those dfbeta-residuals are the approximate change 
in the coefficient vector if that observation were dropped. Due to the exponential form of our 
survival distribution, most observations are made in the lower tail of the distribution. Therefore, 
dfbeta-residuals that measure the influence of each point and that are very "sensitive" in the upper 
tail - far from the mean of the observations - yield significantly better results in showing the time 
dependency of RECALL than plotting Schoenfeld- or deviance-residuals. Using the influence works 
like a magnifying glass that is especially important in our survival curve. The dfbeta-residuals can 
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be computed based on a slightly changed Newton-Raphson algorithm that estimates the influence 
of each point by dropping the points successively. FIGURE 3.1. and FIGURE 3.2. present a residual 
plot for the RECALL-covariate. This residual-plot is based on the short data set (II); this 
corresponds to choosing the quantile τ  such that 80.≤τ . FIGURE 3.1. shows the dfbeta-residuals 
ordered by index of the observation. Note that those 1364 observations where the subjects have 
anticipated recall to their prior job, have deliberately been indexed with the highest numbers, e.g. 
their index is higher than 9421.  
In the dfbeta-plot, an observation has a negative dfbeta-residual if its removal caused βˆ  (the 
corresponding coefficient for the fitted model) to increase. The interpretation is obvious: The 
residuals for the subjects that indicated recall (index > 9421) are below zero in the lower tail of 
the distribution, and above zero in the upper tail. A smoothing line through those residuals (with 
RECALL=1) had a positive slope, indicating that the residuals for those subjects tend to ask for a 
lower fitted value of βˆ  for the lower tail of the distribution, but for a higher fitted value of βˆ  for 
the upper tail of the distribution. This has an interesting interpretation: Anticipated recall to one's 
prior job has an estimated detrimental effect over the lower tail, i.e. subjects with recall 
expectation made less efforts to become reemployed in the first weeks of their unemployment. 
FIGURE 3.2. makes that clear. Here, we plotted the residuals over the event time. FIGURE 3.1. has 
shown that the line of residuals with the positive slope can be attributed to those subjects that 
anticipated recall, and the line with the negative slope is the line for those individuals that had not 
anticipated recall. We performed this graphical analysis by just fitting the model to the covariate 
RECALL. However, the result is nearly identical if we plot the residuals after having fitted the 
model including all significant covariates. 
Note that this interpretation here is not limited to a certain group of people, such as white 
males, but we included the whole dataset (up to event week 26) in this plot. Certainly, this idea 
can also be limited to only a particular group, and - depending on the chosen subgroup - the effect 
can be seen to be even stronger or weaker. However, we have to keep in mind that the graphical 
argument given above is rather qualitative, no quantitative information about the strength of the 
effect is obtained and the confidence of this interpretation is not measured.  
The dfbeta-residual plot also shows useful results for other covariates. But since the time-
dependency of the RECALL variable was obviously the strongest of all covariates (as the test for 
nonproportionality has shown), the presentation of the residual-plot of the RECALL variable is the 
most interesting. 
There are two ways of dealing with the RECALL-variable: We can introduce time-dependent 
covariates or we can stratify on the RECALL-covariate. In our case, it would make sense to fit the 
model to the new covariate RECALL*Time, instead of simply fitting it to the covariate RECALL. 
This way, the effect of the covariate RECALL would increase over time and a better fit could be 
expected according to what the graphical analysis above has shown. Due to the small proportion 
of the recall-subjects, the success of the introduction of this time-dependency was is rather modest 
- no better fit (as measured by the value of the partial-likelihood) can be achieved. Therefore, we 
decide to stratify on the RECALL-covariate. 
According to the general stratified Cox model, the hazard for individual j is given as:  
) )(exp(X )(),( j0,, βtthxth gjg = .           (7) 
g = 1,2,…,k  are the strata that are defined as the different categories of the stratification variable. 
Consequently, in our case k = 2, i.e. we have 2 strata, RECALL=0 and RECALL=1. 
Note that the stratified variable is not explicitly included in the model, this means that due to 
stratification, RECALL is not a covariate any more.  The notation shows that the baseline hazard 
function )(0, thg  is different for each stratum. However, the coefficients p1,...,ββ  are the same for 
each stratum. As a consequence, the estimates of hazard ratios are also the same for each stratum. 
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But since the baseline hazard functions are different for each stratum, the fitted stratified Cox-PH-
model will yield different estimated survival curves for each stratum. This is exactly what we 
want to achieve since the RECALL covariate has an influence on the survival curve that is strongly 
time-dependent. 
 
3.3. FITTING THE COX-PH-MODEL WITH THE STEPWISE REGRESSION PROCEDURE 
A major interest of this survival analysis is to identify from the many available covariates a 
small subset of prognostic factors that relate significantly to the length of the unemployment time 
of the subjects. Including a predictor that has no real relationship to survivorship should certainly 
be avoided, i.e. the type I - error has to be minimized. To achieve this, we proceed similar to the 
case of standard multiple regression analysis: According to a specified criterion for including a 
covariate, we add into or remove the covariates from the model, one at a time. Of course, the most 
significant covariate is automatically chosen first. 
Le (1997) proposes the stepwise regression procedure for fitting a survival model. Our 
criterion is the value of the likelihood ratio chi-squared statistic, which is applied after each 
removal or addition of a new covariate: 
)],...,,,...,,ˆ(ln),...,,ˆ([ln2 1111
2
niinLR XXXXLXXL +−−= ββχ    (8) 
Note that the likelihood function )(L ⋅  used here is the partial likelihood function introduced by 
Cox, (1972). 
For fitting our model, we choose a significance-level of 0.05 for the likelihood ratio chi-
squared statistic and - due to its relevance for our interpretation - the variables indicating the 
treatment group, TG1,…,TG5, are a priori included as a covariate. (The variable TG0 is not 
included since it causes convergence problems of the Newton-Raphson-algorithm - but the 
interpretation of the results is still straightforward.) 
The long data set (I) then yields the following sequence of covariates added to the model 
(sorted by the order they have been added to the model): 
AGEGT54 - AGELT35 - LUSD - FEMALE - NONDURABLE - BLACK - HISPANIC - DURABLE - Q4 
TABLE 3.1. shows estimates for the covariate-coefficients together with their significance after 
fitting the model to all covariates that have been found by the stepwise regression procedure: 
For the short data set (II), the following sequence of covariates has been added to the model: 
BLACK - Q2 - AGELT35 - NONDURABLE - LUSD - HISPANIC - AGEGT54 - DEP - OTHRACE - MULD 
The table below gives the coefficient estimates and their significance: 
Obviously the likelihood ratio test is much better for the long data set (I). Furthermore, we see 
that we have 9 significant variables (we do not count the treatment indicator variables here) for (I) 
but 10 significant variables for (II) and that the signifcant covariates (and also their ordering) are 
not the same in both cases. There are 6 variables that are significant in both models: AGEGT54, 
AGELT35, LUSD, NONDURABLE, BLACK and HISPANIC. The effects are similar in both models; 
however, the absolute effect is stronger for BLACK and HISPANIC in version (II) but stronger for 
AGELT35, LUSD and AGEGT54 in version (I).  
 
3.4. COMPARISON WITH THE RESULTS OBTAINED BY THE QUANTILE REGRESSION AND THE 
LINEAR REGRESSION 
Are these results approximately as anticipated in the quantile regression analysis? We have to 
keep in mind that the covariates in the Cox-PH-model act as a scale shift of the baseline hazard. A 
particular coefficient obtained by fitting our model characterizes the effect over the entire 
distribution without paying special attention to the effect at certain quantiles of the distribution. 
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Koenker&Xiao's (2001) results show that "not only the treatment effect of the bonus payment, but 
many other of the covariates appear to affect the conditional distribution of unemployment 
duration in ways that are poorly approximated either by pure location and/or scale shifts." The 
pure scale shift assumption of the survival model proposed here obviously paints a less complete 
picture of the varied effects of the covariates on the survival, but for assessing the overall effect of 
one covariate on the expected mean or median unemployment time, we have to rely on these 
"condensed" coefficients.   
In both versions, AGEGT54 has a negative effect on the hazard, meaning that the 
unemployment spell of individuals that are older than 54 years is generally longer. This can be 
expected from the quantile regression results. Surprisingly, the linear regression in the Final 
Report yields a positive effect of AGEGT54 on the hazard - but the reported effect is less strong 
than that for the other age-groups (Ages 25-34 and Ages 35-54). The coefficient of AGELT35 is 
positive in both the linear and the quantile regression, indicating that young people are 
reemployed more quickly. This corresponds to the results in all other analyses. As expected, LUSD 
has a negative effect on the unemployment duration, this corresponds to the findings of the 
quantile regression and the linear regression. NONDURABLE has a positive impact on the hazard, 
implying that the unemployment duration for subjects working in the sector of nondurable 
manufacturing is generally lower. In the linear regression case, NONDURABLE also had a negative 
influence on the employment duration; it has not been tested in the quantile regression. 
 BLACK has very strong positive effect on the hazard in the short version (II), and a 
considerably weaker positive effect in the long version (I). These results correspond to the linear 
and the quantile regression. Additionally, a graphical influence analysis as in section 3.2. shows 
that the positive effect of the covariate BLACK is most distinct in the lower tail of the distribution. 
This explains why the coefficient is much higher in the shorter version (II) of the model. The 
positive effect of HISPANIC corresponds to the findings in the linear and the quantile regression. In 
(II), Q2 has a negative effect on the hazard, meaning that entering the study in the second quarter 
generally decreased the exit rate. The quantile regression shows an opposite result: Here, entering 
the study in Q2 reduced the duration of unemployment, mostly in the centre of the distribution. 
For the covariates Q1, Q3, Q4 and Q5, this effect was seen to be stronger - this explains why Q2 
has a negative effect on the hazard in our model. 
All other coefficients correspond to the findings in quantile and linear regression. It is 
interesting to note that variables such as DEP, where the quantile regression shows nearly no 
effect in the upper tail, are not significant in the longer version, but they are significant in the 
shorter version.  
Of course, the main idea of the whole experiment was to examine the impact of the different 
treatments on the unemployment spell. With regard to the treatment effects, both versions of the 
model generate qualitatively similar results. Treatment 4, offering the high bonus amount and the 
long duration of qualification period, was not only the most effective in reducing the 
unemployment spell, but also the most significant in both versions of the model. Treatment 2 has 
a less strong negative effect on unemployment time than treatment 4; unlike the results of the 
linear regression, treatment 1, 3 and 5 have a very weak effect on the unemployment reduction. 
Looking at the confidence intervals, we even see that they have no significant effect. Moreover, 
the confidence bands show that all our conclusions regarding the treatment effects stand on 
relatively shaky ground. 
Based on the PH-assumption, we can conclude from the short model for example that a 
member of treatment group 4 has a 1.095 fold increase of its probability to leave unemployment in 
the next time-step in comparison to a member in the control group. Remember that the scale-shift 
assumption becomes very clear here: In the Cox-PH-Model Treatment 4 just causes a scale shift 
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of the survival distribution, not reflecting the fact that was found in the QR-regression, that the 
effect of TG4 is very strong in the 2nd and 3rd quartile of the distribution, but very weak in the first 
and the last quartile.  
From a policy standpoint, information on the mean or median unemployment time in response 
to different treatments is more interesting - e.g. for a benefit-cost analysis - than an analysis of the 
treatment effects on the hazard.  
Since it obviously doesn't make sense in our case to create something like a "mean 
individual", the estimates for mean and median survival time are calculated for the following 
covariate values (Individuals with these characteristics were very frequent in the sample): 
Long version (I):  
AGEGT54=0, AGELT35=0, LUSD=0, FEMALE=0, NONDURABLE=0, BLACK=0, HISPANIC=0, 
DURABLE=0, Q4=0 
Short Version (II): 
BLACK=0,Q2=0,AGELT35=0,NONDURABLE=0,LUSD=0,HISPANIC=0,AGEGT54=0,DEP=0 
OTHRACE=0, MULD=0 
After having estimated the baseline hazard )(0 th  for each of the two strata we can calculate 
the survival function as presented in equation (2). Then, for the median survival time Tmedian, we 
have:  S(Tmedian) = 0.5.  
The mean survival time Tmean is calculated as the area under the survival curve: 
∫∞==
0
)()( dttSTETmean              (9) 
There is a discussion on whether the mean or the median survival time is more meaningful. 
Since we want to compare our results to the results of the linear regression, we should focus on 
the mean survival time instead of the median survival time. The following brief proposition 
explains why: 
Proposition: The mean survival as calculated in the Final Report is the same as the area under 
the Kaplan-Meier-survival-curve of the long data set (1). 
Proof.  Note that our model is discrete in time (time unit = [weeks]). In the Final Report, the mean 
survival time MSF is then calculated as: 
∑
=
⋅−−=
T
t
t
PT
)t(P)t(P)T(MSF
1
1 ,  where P(t) is the number of people that are still unemployed at 
time t. PT is the total number of people that take part in the experiment. Obviously: P(0)=PT. T is 
the total number of weeks of the analysed experiment, in our case T=52. 
According to the Kaplan-Meier-estimate, the surviving proportion of people at time t is 
PT
tP )( . 
Then the mean survival time MSK is calculated as the area under the Kaplan-Meier-survival 
curve:  
∑
=
=
T
t PT
)t(P)T(MSK
0
. 
Remember that we have no censored events. This implies that at we have no unemployed 
individual at the end of the experiment, after 52 weeks. The estimates for the mean survival time 
of the Final Report have been calculated based on the 13913 individuals that are registered as 
reemployed in week 52. No censoring implies that P(52)=P(T)=0. 
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Now, Complete Induction helps: 
Induction Start: T=1 
)(MSFPT
PT
))(P)(P(
PT
PT
PT
))(P)(P(
PT
MSK(1) 1110111101 ==−===+=   
Induction Step: T ? T+1  
)T(P
PT
)T(MSK)T(MSK 11 +=+  
)T(P
PT
)T(MSF)T())T(P(
PT
T))T(P(
PT
)T(MSF)T(MSF 110111 +=+⋅−+⋅−+=+  
Since MSF(T)=MSK(T) by hypothesis, we find the desired result: MSF(T+1)=MSK(T+1)   
Obviously, this result holds in general for all uncensored and time-discrete survival distributions. 
                   ________ 
The following tables1 present the results. Note that the two different strata have different survival 
curves, as expected. 
Long version (I): 
 
Short version (II):  
 
If we look at the change of unemployment weeks in response to the different treatments, we 
find the results that we have expected from our analysis of the treatment covariates.  The results 
for the mean unemployment duration are generally the same as those in Corson et al. (1992) and 
in Meyer (1995), although - logically - the induced reduction in unemployment spell is lower in 
the results of the short version (II). The weakness of the effect of treatment 3 in the long version 
is remarkable, especially in comparison with the linear and the quantile regression results. 
However, the standard errors are significantly lower than in the other studies based on linear 
regression (in these studies, we have standard errors from 0.26 to 0.34). This can be attributed to 
the survival regression that provides a better fit than a linear regression. Note also that the 
standard errors are the lowest in the short version of the model. In this version, we avoided the 
huge "irregularity" in week 27. A general comparison with the linear regression results shows that 
the survival analysis implies less strong treatment effects than the linear regression. 
We conclude this analysis with a graph of the Kaplan-Meier estimate of the survival, along 
with pointwise 95% confidence intervals (figure 3.3). The shape of this curve shows that the idea 
of using the Cox-model to analyse the data instead of a standard linear regression model is quite 
reasonable, at least if we restrict ourselves to the observations with event-time smaller than 26 
weeks. The small standard errors in the mean survival time analysis of version (II) seem to 
confirm that. For investigating covariate effects, and especially for comparing the short-term 
treatment effects, the restriction to a shorter data set might be reasonable and yields reliable 
estimates, since the Cox-PH-model provides a good fit in our case.  
 
4. CONCLUSION 
We have shown that the Pennsylvania Reemployment Bonus Experiment can be analysed with 
a survival analysis framework and a reasonable fit is obtained. The results are similar to the 
results obtained in the Final Report of this experiment. However, the standard errors for the mean 
unemployment time TABLE 2.3. and TABLE 2.4. are considerably lower than those obtained in the 
linear regression framework of the Final Report. This shows that our survival model is helpful for 
an analysis of different covariate effects in the Pennsylvania Bonus Experiment data - here the 
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survival analysis seems to outperform the linear regression approach; but since random sampling 
of the experiment is generally considered to be accurate, this shouldn't have important 
implications for the overall results and the cost-benefit analysis of the Pennsylvania Experiment. 
The overall results of the survival analysis present a slightly less optimistic picture of the 
effectiveness of the different treatments than the linear regression. 
The comparison with the quantile regression approach has shown that - despite its good fit - 
the Cox-PH-model with its underlying assumption that the fixed covariates act as a scale shift of 
the baseline hazard is still very restrictive. A detailed influence analysis shows that most 
covariates effectively not only cause a scale shift, but the Cox-PH-model proposed in this paper 
doesn't account for this. This became especially apparent when we compared the covariate-
coefficients of version (I) and version (II) and we found that those covariates that have a strong 
effect in the lower quartiles of the distribution, but a low effect in the upper quartiles, also had a 
stronger effect in version (II) that is only based on the data up to week 26. 
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FOOTNOTES: 
1) The fact that the numbers for the median results always have the decimals .98,.99,.00,.01,.02 
comes from the fact that some normally distributed noise in the range [-0.02,…,+0.02] has been 
added to the integer duration data (measured in weeks) in order to prevent ties. 
 
 
TABLES AND FIGURES: 
 
 
TABLE 2.1. TREATMENT GROUPS. 
 
Group Bonus Amount Qualification Period Workshop Offer 
Controls 0 0 No 
Treatment 1 Low Short Yes 
Treatment 2 Low Long Yes 
Treatment 3 High Short Yes 
Treatment 4 High Long Yes 
Treatment 5 Declining Long Yes 
Treatment 6 High Long No 
 
Note: The low bonus was 3 times UI weekly benefit amount, the high benefit was 6 times this amount.  The 
declining bonus declined from 6 times the weekly benefit to zero, over a 12 week period. The short qualification 
period was 6 weeks, and the long period was 12 weeks. 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 2.2. TARGET, COLLECTED AND ANALYSIS SAMPLE SIZES. 
 
Group Target m Collected n Analysis n 
Controls 3,000 3,392 3,354 
Treatment 1 1,030 1,395 1,385 
Treatment 2 2,240 2,495 2,428 
Treatment 3 1,740 1,910 1,885 
Treatment 4 1,590 1,771 1,745 
Treatment 5 1,740 1,860 1,831 
Treatment 6 1,780 1,302 1,285 
Total 13,120 14,086 13,913 
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FIGURE 3.1. INFLUENCE GRAPH I 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 3.2. INFLUENCE GRAPH II 
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TABLE 3.1. RESULTS FOR THE LONG DATA SET (I) 
 
 
n = 13913 iβˆ  exp( iβˆ ) se( iβˆ ) z p lower .95 upper .95 
TG1 0.0358 1.036 0.032 1.119 2.60E-01 0.973 1.103 
TG2 0.05816 1.06 0.0267 2.18 2.90E-02 1.006 1.117 
TG3 0.00292 1.003 0.0288 0.101 9.20E-01 0.948 1.061 
TG4 0.09433 1.099 0.0251 3.756 1.70E-04 1.046 1.154 
TG5 0.02301 1.023 0.0291 0.791 4.30E-01 0.967 1.083 
AGEGT54 -0.31552 0.729 0.0304 -10.376 0.00E+00 0.687 0.774 
AGELT35 0.1643 1.179 0.0185 8.891 0.00E+00 1.137 1.222 
LUSD 0.13086 1.14 0.0195 6.726 1.70E-11 1.097 1.184 
FEMALE -0.10846 0.897 0.0176 -6.175 6.60E-10 0.867 0.929 
NONDURABLE 0.13341 1.143 0.0276 4.837 1.30E-06 1.083 1.206 
BLACK 0.12431 1.132 0.0267 4.648 3.40E-06 1.075 1.193 
HISPANIC 0.16166 1.175 0.0456 3.541 4.00E-04 1.075 1.285 
DURABLE -0.05597 0.946 0.0246 -2.277 2.30E-02 0.901 0.992 
Q4 0.0421 1.043 0.0202 2.088 3.70E-02 1.003 1.085 
Likelihood ratio test  
Wald test             
Score (logrank) test  
486  on 14 df,   p=0 
466  on 14 df,   p=0 
471  on 14 df,   p=0 
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TABLE3.2. RESULTS FOR THE SHORT DATA SET (II) 
 
 
n = 10784 iβˆ  exp( iβˆ ) se( iβˆ ) z p lower .95 upper .95 
TG1 0.04507 1.046 0.0367 1.2298 2.20E-01 0.974 1.124 
TG2 0.07509 1.078 0.0303 2.4772 1.30E-02 1.016 1.144 
TG3 0.0625 1.064 0.0329 1.8975 5.80E-02 0.998 1.135 
TG4 0.0905 1.095 0.0285 3.1795 1.50E-03 1.035 1.158 
TG5 -0.00105 0.999 0.0332 -0.0315 9.70E-01 0.936 1.066 
BLACK 0.35167 1.421 0.032 10.9902 0.00E+00 1.335 1.513 
Q2 -0.16239 0.85 0.0241 -6.7382 1.60E-11 0.811 0.891 
AGELT35 0.05845 1.06 0.0212 2.7611 5.80E-03 1.017 1.105 
NONDURABLE 0.13045 1.139 0.0304 4.2912 1.80E-05 1.073 1.209 
LUSD 0.06281 1.065 0.0258 2.4336 1.50E-02 1.012 1.12 
HISPANIC 0.19449 1.215 0.0508 3.8269 1.30E-04 1.1 1.342 
AGEGT54 -0.11053 0.895 0.0364 -3.038 2.40E-03 0.834 0.962 
DEP -0.03731 0.963 0.0128 -2.9096 3.60E-03 0.939 0.988 
OTHRACE 0.27849 1.321 0.1289 2.1613 3.10E-02 1.026 1.701 
MULD -0.05149 0.95 0.0244 -2.1108 3.50E-02 0.905 0.996 
Likelihood ratio test  
Wald test             
Score (logrank) test  
249  on 15 df,   p=0 
257  on 15 df,   p=0 
257  on 15 df,   p=0 
 
 
 
TABLE 3.3. SURVIVAL TIMES FOR DIFFERENT TREATMENTS - LONG VERSION (I) 
 
 
 
Treatment 
Group 
RECALL mean se(mean) median 0.95 LCL 0.95 
UCL 
0 13.9            0.109 12.0 11 13.0 
0 
1 14.5 0.224 13.01 13 14.0 
0 13.6     0.105 11 10.0 12 
1 
1 14.2 0.215 13 13.0 14 
0 13.4 0.102 11.02 10.0 12.0 
2 
1 14.1 0.209 13.0 12.0 14.0 
0 13.9 0.108 12.0 10.0 13.01 
3 
1 14.5 0.223 12.99 13.0 14. 
0 13.0 0.0987 10 9 11 
4 
1 13.8 0.2005 13 12 13 
0 13.7   0.106 11 10 12.01 
5 
1 14.3 0.218 13 13 14 
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TABLE 3.4. SURVIVAL TIMES FOR DIFFERENT TREATMENTS - SHORT VERSION (II) 
 
 
Treatment 
Group 
RECALL mean se(mean) median 0.95 LCL 0.95 
UCL 
0 8.57            0.0846 6 5.98 6.98 
0 
1 12.18 0.1698 12 12.00 12.02 
0 8.24     0.0799 5.99 5.0 6.01 
1 
1 11.93 0.1625 12.00 12.0 12.01 
0 8.03   0.0768 5.01 5.0 6 
2 
1 11.76 0.1578 12.00     12.0       12 
0 8.12 0.078 5.98 5.0        6 
3 
1 11.83 0.160 12.00     12.0 12 
0 7.92 0.0752 5.01 5.0        6 
4 
1 11.68 0.1555 12.00     11 12 
0 8.57     0.0847 6 5.02 6.99 
5 
1 12.18 0.1700 12 11.99    12.02 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 3.3. KAPLAN-MEIER SURVIVAL CURVE (WITH TWO-SIDED 0.95-CONFIDENCE INTERVAL) 
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